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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3146 
____________ 
 
QI LU WU, 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-299-188) 
Immigration Judge: Donald V. Ferlise 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  December 12, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Qi Lu Wu (“Wu”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final 
order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Wu, a native and citizen of China, attempted to enter the United States on April 5, 
2001.  On May 8, 2001, removal proceedings were initiated against him; a Notice to 
Appear filed in Immigration Court in Chicago charged that he was removable under 
Immigration & Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), as an alien 
who by fraud or misrepresentation sought to procure a visa.  Venue eventually was 
changed to Philadelphia, and Wu applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he was persecuted in 
China because he and his wife violated China’s coercive population control  policy.  Wu 
alleged that his wife had been forced to undergo an abortion.  A merits hearing convened 
on May 13, 2003 before Immigration Judge Donald Ferlise.  Following the hearing, 
Judge Ferlise sustained the charges against Wu and found that his testimony in support of 
his asylum application had not been truthful.  The application was denied, and, 
additionally, Judge Ferlise found that it was frivolous.  An order of removal to China was 
issued.  On September 8, 2004, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Wu’s 
appeal, concluding that there was no clear error in Judge Ferlise’s adverse credibility 
determination.  The Board did not specifically address the frivolous asylum application 
finding.  On December 8, 2004, Wu filed a pro se motion to reopen with the Board to 
submit new evidence in support of his asylum application.  The Board denied it on 
February 22, 2005. 
 For the next eight years, Wu continued to live in the United States; he neither 
departed on his own nor was he removed by immigration authorities.  On April 22, 2013, 
Wu filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  Noting that his wife had 
3 
 
come to the United States in May, 2010, and that she was currently applying for asylum 
based on the same events that his application had been based upon, Wu argued that Judge 
Ferlise’s adverse credibility determination in his case was not supported by substantial 
evidence, that the frivolous asylum application determination was based on speculation, 
and that Judge Ferlise had since been the subject of “widespread reports of misconduct.”  
A.R. 20.1
 On June 20, 2013, the Board granted Wu’s motion in part and denied it in part.  
The Board held that the motion, which was both to reopen and reconsider, was untimely 
filed.  In addition, as a pure motion to reopen, it was also numerically barred.  The Board 
further held that Wu did not allege or establish that his motion fit within any of the 
exceptions to the time and number limits established by the statute and regulations.  The 
Board then considered its sua sponte power to reopen or reconsider cases where 
exceptional circumstances are demonstrated, see Matter of J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 
1997), and concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist to reopen or reconsider 
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.  The Board reasoned that Wu failed to explain 
why he waited such a substantial amount of time before challenging the IJ’s adverse 
credibility determination on the ground of judicial misconduct, and, in addition, Wu did 
  Wu also offered explanations for many of the discrepancies cited by Judge 
Ferlise in denying his original application.  In support of the motion, Wu submitted 
evidence, including his wife’s asylum application and a 2006 article concerning Judge 
Ferlise. 
                                              
1 In Cham v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006), we noted that improper 
conduct had occurred at the alien’s hearing, and that Judge Ferlise often and improperly 
found asylum applications to be frivolous, see id. at 690 n.5. 
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not present sufficient evidence to establish that Judge Ferlise’s conduct at his hearing 
deprived him of a full and fair hearing.  Further, the Board concluded that, even if the 
adverse credibility determination were to be reversed, Wu had not made out a prima facie 
case for asylum, citing Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008) (husband of 
woman who was subjected to forced abortion is not per se eligible for asylum).  The 
Board then exercised its sua sponte power to reconsider the IJ’s finding that Wu’s asylum 
application was frivolous “in the interest of fairness.”  A.R. 4.  The Board revised its 
September 8, 2004 decision to state that Judge Ferlise’s frivolous application finding was 
vacated, reasoning that the finding did not comply with certain of the Board’s subsequent 
precedential decisions, including Matter of B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 236 (BIA 2010).   
 Wu timely petitioned for review.  We generally have jurisdiction to review a final 
order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  We review the denial of a 
motion to reopen or reconsider for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).  Under the deferential abuse of discretion 
standard, we will not overturn the Board’s decision unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to the law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  We uphold 
the Board’s factual determinations underlying the denial of the motion to reopen or 
reconsider if they are “‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on 
the record considered as a whole.’”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 
481 (1992)).   
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 We will deny the petition for review.  The Board did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Wu’s motion to reopen as time- and number-barred, and his motion to reconsider 
as time-barred.  A party may file only one motion to reopen and such motion must be 
filed no later than 90 days after the date of the removal order.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), a motion to reconsider must 
be filed within 30 days after the date of the Board’s decision.  See also 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(6)(B).  Wu does not dispute that his April, 2013 motion was time- and number-
barred to the extent that he sought reopening of his removal proceedings, and untimely to 
the extent that he sought reconsideration of the Board’s September 8, 2004 decision.  Nor 
does he dispute that he did not establish that his motion fit within any of the recognized 
exceptions to the time and number limits established by the statute and regulation, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(iv).   
 Instead, Wu argues in his brief that we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s 
decision declining to use its sua sponte authority to reopen and reconsider his asylum 
proceedings, that the time and number restrictions for his motion to reopen and 
reconsider should be excused due to judicial misconduct, that the record supports a 
finding that Judge Ferlise’s conduct deprived him of a full and fair hearing, and that, if he 
had received a full and fair hearing, reversal of the adverse credibility finding would 
result in a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 6.     
 We disagree that we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision declining to 
use its sua sponte authority to reopen and reconsider the agency’s adverse credibility 
determination.  Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the Board may “at any time reopen . . . on its 
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own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”  The regulation grants the 
Board broad discretion “to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made 
out a prima facie case for relief.”  Id.  The Board has explained that it exercises its sua 
sponte authority “sparingly, treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships created 
by enforcement of the time and number limits in the motions regulations, but as an 
extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.”  Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999).  The Board’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte 
authority to reopen proceedings is unreviewable, except where the Board relies on an 
incorrect legal premise.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  
See also Pllumi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (remand 
proper where Board may have mistakenly thought that it did not have authority to 
consider alien’s health concerns as “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B)).   
Here, the Board did not rely on any incorrect legal premises in declining to reopen 
and reconsider Judge Ferlise’s adverse credibility determination.  Wu argues that the 
Board implied the existence of reviewable exceptional circumstances in his case – in the 
form of judicial misconduct – by vacating Judge Ferlise’s frivolous asylum application 
finding.  See Petitioner’s Brief, at 8-9.  We do not agree.  The Board did not make any 
finding of judicial misconduct in Wu’s case.  The Board concluded that Wu did not 
present sufficient evidence to establish that Judge Ferlise’s conduct deprived him of a full 
and fair hearing.  In determining that Judge Ferlise’s frivolous asylum application finding 
should be vacated, the Board did not make a finding of misconduct; it simply held that 
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the determination did not comport with its more recent decisions that require specific 
findings that material elements of the claim have been deliberately fabricated, see, e.g., 
Matter of B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 236 (in making frivolousness determination, IJ must 
make explicit findings that incredible aspects of asylum application were material and 
deliberately fabricated, but IJ may incorporate factual findings made in support of 
adverse credibility determination in doing so).   
Because the Board neither misperceived the relevant law nor misunderstood its 
sua sponte authority, we have no basis for exercising jurisdiction over the Board’s 
determination that exceptional circumstances did not exist to reopen or reconsider the IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination in Wu’s case.2
                                              
2 In Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 666 F.3d 118, 129 (3d Cir. 2012), we held that we 
may review the Board’s exercise of its sua sponte authority to grant reopening.  The 
Board’s decision here to grant reconsideration in part and vacate the frivolous asylum 
application finding would be reviewable under Chehazeh if a party who had standing to 
appeal was seeking review of the decision, McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 313 
(3d Cir. 1989) (in order to have standing to appeal a party must be aggrieved by the order 
from which it seeks to appeal).  The Government does not challenge the Board’s decision 
to vacate the frivolous application finding. 
  To the extent that Wu has argued that 
judicial misconduct warrants that the time and number restrictions for motions to reopen 
or reconsider be tolled or excused, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 10-11, we agree with the 
Board’s determination that Wu failed to account for the substantial amount of time that 
passed before he challenged the adverse credibility determination on the basis of judicial 
misconduct, cf. Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2005) (attorney 
conduct may provide basis for equitable tolling of deadline for motion to reopen if alien 
shows that he was diligent in bringing his claim), and we see no abuse of discretion in the 
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Board’s determination that Wu did not show that Judge Ferlise engaged in misconduct at 
his particular hearing.  Last, because we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s 
decision to deny Wu’s motion to reopen and reconsider as procedurally defective, and 
because we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte 
authority to reopen or reconsider the adverse credibility determination, we conclude that 
it is unnecessary for us to address Wu’s additional argument that reversal of the adverse 
credibility finding would result in a prima facie showing of his eligibility for asylum. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
